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THE MADONNAS PLAY TUG OF WAR
WITH THE WHORES
OR
WHO IS SAVING THE UCC?
Corinne Cooper*
I suppose that this Essay should be a tribute to Fred Miller,1 but
Fred is too young for such a tribute. When, if ever, he gets around to
retiring, I'll just recycle this piece. It might as well be a tribute to Fairfax
Leary,2 recently departed and still strongly missed. The last time I saw
Fax, shortly before his death, he was still ribbing me about the misinter-
pretation of some Code provision he thought a court had made, which I
had the audacity to defend.' These two wise scholars, and countless
* Corinne Cooper is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law. She has spent the last eleven years of her life trying to make the UCC
interesting for her students, as well as exploring its more esoteric points in her spare time. A
graduate of the University of Arizona with a B.A. in 1975 and a J.D. in 1978, she practiced
law in Phoenix, Arizona, before entering teaching.
1. Fred, for those of you not among the cognoscenti, is the George L. Cross Research
Professor and Kenneth McAfee Centennial Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma
School of Law. In 1992, Fred became the Executive Director of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Fred is the guardian angel of uniformity.
2. Fairfax Leary was one of the drafters of Article 9, an associate reporter for Article 3
and a principle reporter for Article 4 of the UCC. A professor throughout much of his life, he
retired as the Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, The Delaware Law School of Widener
University. He received his A.B. in 1932 from Princeton University, and his J.D. in 1935 from
Harvard Law School. For a delightful commentary on his involvement in the original Code,
see Fairfax Leary, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1982). For a summary of his
distinguished career, see Patricia B. Fry, Dedication to Fairfax Leary, 42 ALA. L. REV. 351
(1991); Homer Kripke, Dedication to Fairfax Leary, Jr., 42 ALA. L. REv. 356 (1991); and
Anthony J. Santaro et al., Tribute to Professor Fairfax Leary, Jr., 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 823
(1987).
3. The research for this Essay led me across the argument again, this time in print. See
Leary, supra note 2, at 562 n.18.
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others before them, stretching back to Karl Llewellyn 4 and Soia Ment-
schikoff,5 are the heroes of this story.
The morality play I am about to expose is an epic struggle. Madon-
nas? Whores?6 Surely these words are too strong. But they serve to
identify the two essential opponents who struggle for control of the
UCC-those of us who write, argue, lobby, and fight over the language
of the Code.7
Like all good morality plays, this one represents a struggle between
good and evil, and like all morality plays, good is supposed to win.
4. Karl Llewellyn can accurately be described as the father of the Uniform Commercial
Code. He was the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code of the Conference of
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, beginning in 1943. He was a member of
the New York Commission on Uniform State Laws from 1926 through 1951. He was the
Reporter for the Uniform Revised Sales Act, and a life member of the Conference of Uniform
State Laws. For an interesting study of his life, with particular attention to his role as a
founding member of the philosophy of legal realism, see WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEW-
ELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1985). Professor Llewellyn died in 1962, but his im-
pact on commercial law was so profound and the reach of his vision so powerful that even
today it is not unfair to refer to the UCC as the "lex Llewellyn." See Eugene F. Mooney, Old
Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commer-
cial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 221 n.13 (1966). This phrase was first used in Mitchell
Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 330, 333 (1951).
5. Soia Mentschikof'was a leading legal educator and scholar. If Karl Llewellyn was the
father of the Code, Soia was surely its mother. She began working with Llewellyn as his
research assistant at Columbia, and continued working, becoming the Associate Chief Re-
porter for the Code. They were married in 1947. She became the first woman to teach at
Harvard Law School, and later the first to teach at the University of Chicago. She was the first
woman dean, becoming Dean of the University of Miami School of Law. She retired in 1982,
and died in 1984 at the age of 69. For information on her involvement in the drafting of the
UCC, see TWINING, supra note 4. For her delightful reflections on the experience, see Soia
Mentschikotf, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (1982). For a summary of her
career, see Warren E. Burger, Tribute to Dean Soia Mentschikoff, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. ix
(1983); Richard A. Hausler, In Honor of Dean Soia Mentschikoff, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. xi
(1983); and Irwin P. Stotzky, Soia's Way: Toiling in the Common Law Tradition, 38 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 373 (1984).
6. I am not unaware of the criticism that will result from my use of female archetypes as
the terminals of the good-evil continuum. Because the group to whom I am applying them is
largely male (that is, most of them are men), I feel that the use is not sexist. And while I have
yet to encounter a male madonna, see, eg., MADONNA, SEX (1992), "whore" has become a
suitably generic word.
And anyway, I'm just a UCC professor. What could I know about feminist jurispru-
dence? I could have used the Federation and the Klingons, but it's too cute.
7. My lawyer demands that I include the following disclaimer: The "madonna" and
"whore" terminology is not intended to refer to any individual or group. No person or organi-
zation identified or referred to in any way is intended to be branded with either title. This is
satire. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). If you see yourself in either
role, that is your problem.
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Therefore let there be no mistake at the outset: I am on the side of the
madonnas. What are we fighting?
There is a cadre of lawyers who attend ABA meetings, ALI meet-
ings, drafting committee meetings, study committee meetings, NCCUSL
meetings, and finally, who whine, dine, and cajole state legislators, in the
paid pursuit of a legislative conclusion favorable to their clients. Some of
them are private practitioners, some of them may be lawyers for govern-
ment agencies, and more than a few are lawyer-lobbyists for industry
organizations. They wear good suits, stay in good hotels, and know their
way around a wrestling ring. They pursue the honorable goal that is the
zenith of the advocate's profession: They zealously represent the inter-
ests of their clients within the bounds of the law.' And, when need and
opportunity coincide, they prod and push, dig in and grip, and yank the
law where they judge, in their biased but self-righteous way, it ought to
go. These are the interest-group representatives ("the whores").
Then there is the group that attends these same meetings, sometimes
staying at the Motel 6, eating at the cocktail receptions (and even at the
table of the whores, should the opportunity arise) who pursue a far differ-
ent goal. They want the law to make sense. They want progress, yes,
and goodness knows they all want law that works (we were listening,
Karl, when you taught this class). They want to refine the language and
fill the holes, to bring the law into line with twenty-first century practices
and ideas. But their polestars are uniformity, consistency, clarity, and a
basis for judging, in the unstated case, which way the result ought to go.9
These are the law reform junkies ("the madonnas").
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Although this
sentiment has been watered down under the ABA Model Rules to: "A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client," MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1992), the comment to that provision echoes the original empha-
sis: "A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." Id Rule 1.3 cmt. It is interesting to me that
10 years after the Model Code was superseded, the language of Canon 7 is the phrase most
easily recalled by both practicing lawyers and law students as embodying the lawyer's role.
If you read the word "zealous" to mean "earnest" or "fervent," then I believe that both
the madonnas and the whores qualify. But if the word engenders blindness, single-minded-
ness, or fanaticism, then it is more appropriately applied to the mission of the whores. I imag-
ine that it was the latter sense of the word that led the drafters of the Model Rules to de-
emphasize its importance, as in practice it was called upon to justify a multitude of excesses.
9. This ability to predict the outcome of an unstated case I would characterize as the
"channeling function," an expanded usage from Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801 (1941). Although the UCC is filled with terms that admit in the
abstract an almost infinite variety of conduct ("unconscionability," "reasonable," or "good
faith") it seems to satisfy the channeling function remarkably well. I have discovered in 10
years of teaching that students have general unanimity when asked to determine, between two
Apri 1993]
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Whether the UCC survives, and whether it can withstand the as-
sault of special interests that would co-opt it for their own purposes, will
ultimately depend upon which group is stronger: the madonnas or the
whores.' 0
given choices, whether a particular act is unconscionable or not, reasonable or not, in good or
bad faith.
Predictability, clarity, and elegance were of paramount importance to Karl Llewellyn. In
his primary work on this subject, he said:
Beauty in things of law has been slighted as if by law; and where not slighted, has
been seen off-center and in spiraled distortion.... Such is a common run of thinking
among those who have meditated upon law as being thus a matter of words: an ill-
advantaged distant cousin of belles lettres, too doltish, for the most part, to be hun-
gry for improvement.
Karl Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 224, 227
(1942). Llewellyn went on to say: "Structured beauty becomes thus the esthetic goal-an
intellectual architecture, clean, rigorous; above all, carried through in sharp chiseling to body
out the predetermined plan, in every vault, in each line, into each angle." Id. at 228. He
stressed that elegance was not simply beauty, but the beauty of functioning, each part and as a
whole:
As a result, or as a means, a logical clarity is present, too. But the prime test of its
legal beauty remains the functional test. Structural harmony, structural grandeur,
are good to have, they add, they enrich; but they are subsidiary. So is ornament.
Legal esthetics are in first essence functional esthetics.
Id. at 229. In sum, he states:
If its Beauty be a Beauty for the Eye only, or of the Mind only, if it be not in first
instance a working Beauty ... then it is false .... But a Structure of legal Rules,
howsoever fair of Face, must function well or be an active Evil to the Men and Work
it houses.
Id at 230.
This real-world perspective, which admits change over time, and which allows the parties
(and later the judge or jury) to determine what is the right thing to do, represents legal realism
at its finest. But it does one thing more: It prevented Karl Llewellyn (or any of the drafters)
from imposing his vision of right or wrong upon future participants in commercial transac-
tions. The individual participants, their industries, their communities, and ultimately, their
generation's social consciousness, would control the outcome. To my mind, regardless of any
pro-business, pro-bank bias that might have affected Llewellyn's perspective, this willingness
to let future generations decide for themselves keeps Llewellyn firmly in the camp of the
madonnas.
10. For purposes of this Essay, I am ignoring the equally interesting question of whether
federalization of the UCC will lead to its demise. I leave that Essay to David Goldstein, who
has been fighting this battle longer than I. See David B. Goldstein, Federal Versus State Adop-
tion of Article 4A, 45 Bus. LAW. 1513 (1990). I only pause here to note that the whores are
not limited to stalking the halls of state houses. They have been seen, I hear, in Congress as
well.
Karl Llewellyn also confronted the issue of federalization. He thought that he could
make the necessary changes in the sales law and achieve uniformity by moving in Congress.
Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100
HARV. L. REv. 465, 479, 483-86 (1987). Ultimately, he worked both in Congress and before
the National Conference. Id. at 484-85.
Federalization of commercial law only addresses the issue of uniformity. Whether clarity
and elegance can also survive in the federal system is much up to chance. I recall a meeting in
the basement of a bad hotel (was it Houston?) where discussion on this topic became un-
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When I went to my first meeting of the UCC Committee of the Busi-
ness Section of the American Bar Association ("the Coliseum"), in 1982
in God knows what forgotten city, sitting in a hotel conference room
which is not distinguishable in my memory from any other, I sat in fasci-
nation as the discussion proceeded around the table. One well-dressed
lawyer, and then another, spoke to the issue at hand: Should we write a
code of conduct for wire transfers? Was it needed at this point? The
comments seemed to break down clearly into three camps: (1) We
needed it desperately now; (2) we didn't need one at all; and (3) there was
a growing need for consistency which suggested a code was in order. At
one point, a lawyer took the microphone to say, in studied tones, that the
Code (which became Article 4A of the UCC) was not needed. This law-
yer said, with simple grace: "We resolve these issues with contracts."
Contracts? I thought. They make contracts with everyone who
sends a wire transfer, with everyone who receives one, with EVERY-
ONE? Would this lawyer argue that we didn't need Article 4 (these were
the olden days, remember, before Reg CC took over our lives11), that
check collection could be handled with contracts? I was dumbfounded.
But, being new at this table, I figured I had misunderstood. So I leaned
over to the gentleman next to me (I think it was Egon Guttman) and
said, "Why did she say that? What does she mean?" And he replied (if
it was Egon, in a knowing tone), "That's the lawyer for the New York
Clearinghouse Association."
I understood perfectly then the lesson that I impart today: You can-
not tell the players without a program. I understood at that pivotal mo-
ment of beginning that you could not interpret the meaning of any
statement made about the law, or what it ought to be, without knowing
whether the speaker was advancing an agenda for a specific client, bring-
ing a general sense of experience to the table, or merely listening in to
learn about the proposals.
I pause here to make an important point: No one of us is actually a
madonna. There are none. And, if I were being honest, I would admit
that there are no total whores. The terms are useful because they identi-
fiably represent absolutes on a familiar continuum. And the continuum
analogy is instructive because it admits the infinite admixture of these
characteristically heated. Someone actually rose from the table to defend the honor of the feds
(in actual fact, the Fed). I am sympathetic to the argument that the Great White Father in
Washington can take care of these issues and fix everything for us so we do not worry our
pretty little heads about this any more. I would like to believe it. It would save me a lot of
travel to Jeff City. Forgive me if I have my doubts. These are the folks who brought us the
Food Security Act ....
11. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1992).
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two qualities. Each of us brings to the table personal experiences,
whether representing clients or advancing theories, which make us less
than perfectly objective, which inevitably bias our perspectives on the
resolution. And all of us, frail humans that we are, invest our positions
with a pride of authorship or advocacy that imbues it with a beauty and
innocence which we will defend if we find it under attack. On occasion I
have found myself advancing a position with a fervor and zeal which
belied the fact that I just thought of it the moment before. We all have a
measure of the whore within us. Consumer advocates are whores for
their constituency, and represent it just as effectively as the bank whores
(although they don't often dine as well).
The question this Essay presents is this: How great a percentage of
input from the whores can the UCC take and still serve its wider
purpose?
I would never suggest (and will not accept criticism for having ar-
gued) that all practitioners are whores, and all law professors are saints. 12
The facts show otherwise. I have known too many insightful, even bril-
liant practicing lawyers, in private practice and government service, who
have been as thoughtful and sincere in their desire for an elegant and just
bit of statutory language to say otherwise. I might even recall a time or
two (but no more) when I wondered if one of my academic colleagues
was secretly on the dole, so clearly were they advancing a pawn here, a
rook there.I3 But for the most part, I have observed lawyers who have as
their main goal to advance the cause of clarity, uniformity, and elegance
(CUE) in commercial law and damn the special interest oxen which are
gored in the process. They are the keepers of the precious flame that is
the UCC, and without their persistence, their vigilance, their almost reli-
gious dedication, the UCC would be nothing but a patchwork quilt of
12. In my research for this Essay I discovered for the first time how powerfully influential
law professors had been in the original drafting of the Code. As they do today, law professors
brought not only their time and scholarship to the drafting process, but also their valuable
independence from the special interests which might otherwise have skewed the drafting of the
Code. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. Rlv. 1 (1968), which states:
Even today, there is a very small minority of seemingly uninformed persons who
refer to the Code as the work of "the law professors," intending this to indicate that
the Code as promulgated was not a body of law prepared by practical lawyers in the
light of reality. Nothing could be less justified than this type of sniping criticism.
Id. at I. Actually, the criticism is probably valid in one sense: The drafting was largely done
by law professors, although the supervision and comment came from practitioners, and from
representatives of the industries covered by its terms. See Mentschikoff, supra note 5; Soia
Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36
A.B.A.J. 419 (1950).
13. Watch for new suits.
[Vol. 26:563
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special interest provisions cobbled together by the guys14 in the blue suits
making more for each and every hour of their participation than my
mortgage payment.
This is not to say that there is unanimity among the madonnas. As
in all things, when there are two lawyers at the table, there are three
opinions. There has been considerable and even bitter disagreement
within the ranks of the madonnas throughout the long law reform pro-
cess. I cite an example from my own experience.
Missouri was one of the last states to adopt the 1972 amendments to
Article 9,15 and I traveled more than a few times to Jeff City to push for
the change. During the process, I remember a long debate I had with my
colleague, Professor Ray Warner, about a little bit of non-uniformity he
wished to include in the Missouri version of section 9-403.16 Ray is a
bankruptcy expert, and the amendment addressed the problem of bank-
ruptcy and the term of a financing statement. Ray argued that the filing
officer should be free to purge the system of financing statements which
appeared to have expired, unless someone notified her that a bankruptcy
had stayed the expiration of the filing. Ray argued for the change be-
cause it provided needed notice to the filing officer, and the representative
of the Secretary of State backed him up. It seemed like a good change,
and I fought it mainly because I believe that uniformity is a valuable
aspect of the UCC, and the amendment was non-uniform. Finally I gave
in, and no dire consequences have resulted. Neither of us operated as
whores in this interaction. I was arguing as a representative of the com-
mercial law bar, and Ray was representing the interests of the bank-
ruptcy bar. Compromise was not difficult to achieve.
14. Where I come from, "guys" is a generic term including scoundrels of both sexes.
15. Act of June 16, 1988, § A, 1988 Mo. Laws 895 (codified in scattered sections within
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 400.9-101 to -507 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
16. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-403(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
If a security interest perfected by filing exists at the time insolvency proceedings are
commenced by or against a debtor, the security interest remains perfected until ter-
mination of the insolvency proceedings and thereafter for a period of sixty days or
until expiration of the five-year period, whichever occurs later. If a security interest
perfected by filing exists at the time insolvency proceedings are commenced by or
against the debtor, the secured party shall give the filing officer written notice of insol-
vency proceedings, and failing such notice, the filing officer may act as though insol-
vency proceedings have not been commenced. Without regard to the secured party's
compliance with this notice requirement, the security interest remains perfected until
the termination of the insolvency proceedings and thereafter for a period of sixty days,
or until the financing statement would otherwise have expired, whichever occurs later.
Upon lapse, the security interest becomes unperfected, unless it is perfected without
filing.
Id (emphasis added (identifying non-uniform language)). On the CUE scale, this amendment
lacks uniformity and elegance, but its import is pretty clear, and it is located where one might
naturally look for such a provision.
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But there was another debate during the Senate hearings that was a
little less high-minded. A representative of the banking industry argued
for the removal of the words "buyer of farm products in the ordinary
course" from the priority rules of section 9-301.17 I tried to explain in
my calmest voice that this change would result in a BIOC of farm prod-
ucts coming in behind even an unperfected secured creditor. Because the
Food Security Act18 had come into effect, and Missouri had done noth-
ing (and has still done nothing) to provide a system of centralized notice,
I was worried about the effect that this language might have on BIOCs of
farm products in Missouri.19 The banker was unmoved and unmoving.
By deleting this language, he achieved a beneficial result for his clients.20
Finally, the chair of the committee recessed the hearing and walked out
with me into the hall.
"Little lady," he said with his charming Ozark lilt, "do ya'll want
unifohmity or ya'll want lahw?" I took the point and caved. Sixty days
later, the Article 9 amendments were enacted.
What I understood from that exchange was the same lesson I
learned on my first political campaign. This banker was in Jeff City with
17. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-301(1)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
18. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
19. The problem is this: The Food Security Act (FSA) provides a means for a secured
creditor in farm products to notify potential buyers and commission merchants of its interest
in the goods. 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988). If notice is provided as required by the statute and
regulations, and the buyer does not comply with the demand of the creditor to receive pay-
ment, the secured creditor's interest remains. Id Nothing in the Act addresses the question
whether the secured creditor must be perfected under state law in order to prevail over a
noncomplying buyer. Rather, it defines "effective financing statement" as one which complies
with the requirements of the Act without reference to its status under state law. Id.
§ 1631(c)(4). Further, it defines "security interest" as "an interest in farm products that
secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id. § 1631(c)(7). There is no reference to
perfection here, either. Presumably the FSA was not intended to preempt and reorder all
priorities between BIOCs of farm products and secured creditors. More likely, it was intended
to preempt the priority of the uniform version of § 9-307(1) and § 9-301(I)(c) that a BIOC of
farm products loses to a perfected secured creditor. This conclusion is bolstered by the lan-
guage of the preamble, which states that state law "permits a secured lender to enforce liens
against a purchaser of farm products even if the purchaser does not know that the sale of the
products violates the lender's security interest in the products." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a)(1). Be-
cause this protection is limited to perfected secured creditors, presumably only that priority is
the evil which the FSA intends to redress.
If the FSA does not preempt all priorities, but only the priority found in § 9-307(1) and
§ 9-301(l)(c) for perfected secured creditors versus BIOCs of farm products, then in all states
but Missouri, an unperfected secured creditor should lose to a BIOC even if the BIOC receives
the notice and ignores it. In Missouri, whether the FSA preempts all state priority rules or
not, the absence of language in § 9-301 as adopted in Missouri implies that a BIOC of farm
products loses to all secured creditors, perfected or not.
20. See supra note 19.
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a mission. He could afford to come back again and again. The legisla-
tors knew him. I'm sure he bought tickets to their fundraisers. His
needs, legislatively, were more important than mine. The legislators
were not selling out their constituents. Who, after all, in the counties
and towns that these gentlemen represented, really cared about a relative
priority fight which had been largely preempted by federal law? If there
was a real problem, the whores representing the buyers of farm products
would arrive in droves.
The point isn't that the banker was evil. It is that clarity, uniform-
ity, and elegance did not have a representative in the Missouri legislature.
I was there representing the madonnas, and the madonnas do not make
campaign contributions, they do not hold fundraisers, they don't even
write irate letters. There is no constituency for uniform, national com-
mercial law reform.
How is this any different than the debate among interest groups
which has always swirled around the UCC? Have I imagined the origi-
nal UCC too purely? Undoubtedly, I have. I am not unaware of the
criticisms aimed at Article 4 that it was a wholesale "sell-out" to bank-
ers.21 And there are clearly provisions of the Code that were concessions
to special interests.22 But in large part, the process has been described,
and the product has arrived, largely free of the influence, either directly
in the drafting process, or indirectly, through the adoption of special in-
terests pursuing merely their own selfish ends.23 I see that process as
fundamentally different (in degree, if not in kind) from the wholesale co-
opting of the Code that is going on today.
21. See, ag., Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?J Commercial Code Should Not
Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952). Professor Beutel referred to Article 4 of the proposed
Code as "a piece of vicious class legislation" perpetrated by bankers on their unwary custom-
ers. Id. at 357. Although he commends the work of Fairfax Leary, who initially attempted to
draft an entirely new collection code, which would allocate risks between banks and customers
more equitably, he argues that Fax was overrun by the "unanimous opposition of the Ameri-
can Banker's Association and counsel and lobbyists who were constantly in attendance." Id.
at 359. This is not so different from Fax's own recollections. In her essay on the drafting of
the Code, Soia Mentschikoff had recalled the process as remarkably free of outside influence.
See Mentschikoff, supra note 5, at 542. Reluctantly, Fax remembered his experience quite
differently: "There were a couple of points [Soia] made about the lack of special interest pres-
sures and I just have to differ the least little bit.... But there was pressure, at least indirectly,
to develop a Code that could be adopted. That meant one special interests would not block."
Leary, supra note 2, at 557. He goes on to detail the specific provisions that were included to
appease interest groups and avoid organized opposition: "Finally, there's no way you can have
a Bank Collection Code and exempt banks. Hence that part of the Code had to be drafted so
as not to produce united opposition." Id at 558.
22. Leary, supra note 2, at 558.
23. See Mentschikoff, supra note 5, at 542; Mentschikoff, supra note 12, at 420.
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You may think my comments too harsh, and my dedication to the
innocents smarmy, but I've been through a lot this year. I have been
reminded (and it is still fresh in my mind) about the value of intellectual
independence, of the freedom to come to conclusions that satisfy me, and
to write about them, hoping to convince the uncommitted reader to un-
derstand, and even agree with my views. It's gotten awfully interesting
to be a law professor lately. Twice in the past year alone, I've been told
by the hardball players that it might not be good for me to write what I
had in mind to write, because their clients would not be happy.
The first occasion was the time I learned that a certain group of
bankers in a certain midwestern state had decided they would "satisfy"
the provisions of federal law (a little piece of legislative pestilence called
the Food Security Act) by publishing a newspaper among themselves to
list their various farm products liens. Hearing of this endeavor, and be-
ing pretty curious about how they imagined that this might satisfy the
requirements of the law, I called the representative of this group of bank-
ers (who shall remain nameless because I know that he would never read
this sort of Essay, and no one will tell him about it unless I call him by
name) to see how it came about. Once I got him on the phone and iden-
tified my purpose, I asked him point blank if he had advised his organiza-
tion, or if someone else had advised his client banks, that this little
newspaper was sufficient compliance with the notice provisions of the
Food Security Act.
In a nanosecond, I was on the speaker phone. Others (nameless to
me) were called into the room to hear the conversation. And he said to
me, in a tone reminiscent of The Godfather, that I ought not delve into
this matter, that it wouldn't be good for me to pursue it. They had very
carefully researched the issue, they had devised this solution, they had
agreed among themselves that this would suffice, and they didn't want
any smart law professor mucking up the works! The tone suggested
everything but, "You wouldn't want to mess up a pretty face over this."
I had a colleague, fortuitously, in the office with me at the time. I don't
have a speaker phone, so I just repeated what I was hearing. The gentle-
men in the room seemed not to notice, assuming I suppose that I was
repeating it in order to make sure I got it right. When I hung up the
phone I looked at her in amazement. "Did you hear that?" I asked.
"Did you hear what I heard?" And she nodded.
I was speechless. I was awestruck to imagine that anything I, a
lowly professor at an obscure state school, could write or say, or even
think, could elicit this kind of response. Someone was not only going to
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read what I wrote but object to it strenuously? Not because it was stupid
but because it was dangerous? I was thrilled beyond reason.
Well, the fact is that I've been too busy to write the damned article,
but I do tell all of my secured transactions students about this whenever
we cover the Food Security Act. I describe this little exchange so they
will understand the requirements of the statute, so they will not delude
their clients into believing that this system is sufficient (although its insti-
tutional mantle makes it seem legitimate), so they will think that it is
sometimes exciting to be a UCC lawyer, and particularly, in case my Jeep
blows up one day, so they will press the police to look for a timer.24
I thought that this was an anomaly of the first order, unprecedented
as it was in my lifetime. And it thrilled me beyond words to imagine the
importance of my work, which most of the time strikes me as appallingly
narrow and obscure.25 But the adrenaline had hardly worn off when it
happened again.
I was in the last few weeks of writing a chapter for a book about the
UCC. I was buried in a piece of minutiae, a question that seems to have
taken over my entire academic career. In the course of writing about
cases that were likely to arise in upcoming years, I contacted a couple of
industry lawyers to inquire about their views on this issue.
The first of them spoke to me at length about his role, suggesting
that while he encouraged state legislatures to enact statutes approving of
the practices engaged in by his clients26 (a well-known and widely vilified
group2 7), he also encouraged his clients to take positions and to adopt
practices which decreased the likelihood that they would come under
attack. "We can work with legislators to enact statutes which regulate
our clients' conduct," he said, "or we can wait until they act on their
own to put us out of business." To me, this lawyer represents the best of
a bad breed. He was candid about his role. When bad judicial gloss has
affected his clients' activities, he was not above amending the Code to
24. This is a joke. Let me state for the record that I understand I am more likely to die at
the hands of an irate student or a drunk driver than I am from the retribution of a lobbyist,
even after this little poison pen letter reaches print.
25. Have you ever tried to explain to your nonlawyer friends, or your family what you do
for a living? I have finally hit upon a tangible example of my work which I now use. "You
know that little line on the back of your checks?" I inquire. When they nod in agreement, I
say, "I did that." With apologies to Bob Ballen and the Federal Reserve, this is as close as I
can come to explaining to anyone what I do as a scholar.
26. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3601 (West Supp. 1992) (Consumer Rental
Purchase Agreement Act).
27. The "Rent-to-Own" industry is an interest group which has kept an entire generation
of assistant attorneys general, legal aid lawyers, and consumer advocates busy at the bar.
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"fix" things.28 But for the most part, the industry has been willing to live
within the strictures of the uniform UCC.
My next encounter was with another lawyer who viewed his job
even more directly as the zealous defender of special interests. An indus-
try representative, this lawyer had taken the position in several articles
that the absence of damning language in the amendment to section 1-
201(37)29 was intended as an imprimatur for the activities of his clients.
Specifically, he had argued that terminal rent adjustment clause
(TRAC) 30 leases were true leases under the amended definition.31 When
I called to question him about this position, he responded with alacrity.
"Are you going to write something against our interests?" he bris-
tled over the phone. "Please let me see a copy of your article before it
goes to print, so that we may correct any misconceptions you have." Fat
chance of that. "If you attack our position, we will have to react
strongly." Again, I felt that thrill racing through my veins. Someone
was going to read what I wrote. I must be on the right track if I'm
getting this kind of reaction.
What I decided to do is to find out exactly how the lobbyists oper-
ated. I contacted members of the UCC drafting committee that had put
together Article 2A. I asked them what their memories were: Did the
absence of language about TRAC leases suggest an imprimatur? Every-
one remembered a debate about TRAC leases. No language approving
TRAC leases was ever included in a draft. Several remember that a pri-
vate compromise was reached which deleted language from the com-
ments damning TRAC leases.3 2 As a result, there are two possible
interpretations: The absence of a comment disapproving of TRAC leases
was intended as an implicit approval, or the absence of a comment was a
compromise not intended to approve of the practice. The lobbyist took
the former position, and I took the latter.
28. See, eg., NEB. REv. STAT. § 1-201(37) (Supp. 1990). "'Security interest' does not
include a consumer rental purchase agreement as defined in the Consumer Rental Purchase
Agreement Act." Id.
29. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987).
30. TRAC leases are transactions in which the rent is retroactively adjusted based on the
proceeds received upon disposition of the collateral at the end of the lease. For more than you
ever wanted to read about this particular issue, see Corinne Cooper, Identifying a True Lease
Under UCC § 1-201(3 7), in EQUIPMENT LEASING (forthcoming 1993).
3 1. The TRAC leasing industry takes the position that they are, and I take the position
that they are not. Id.
32. Let me clarify. Nothing in the amended § 1-201(37) or Article 2A prohibits any of the
practices of the TRAC leasing industry. The issue is exclusively whether TRAC leases are




Except for the tone, there was nothing particularly noteworthy
about our exchange. But in the course of researching this issue, I discov-
ered an act that exemplifies my opposition to the piecemeal destruction
of the UCC by lobbyists. The TRAC leasing industry, having failed to
gain explicit approval of TRAC leases under section 1-201(37), not being
content to argue for its approval from the absence of a comment on the
topic, went one step further. They have lobbied state by state for a non-
uniform amendment which states expressly that TRAC leases are true
leases. 33 In many cases, instead of amending section 1-201(37), they have
cleverly hidden the amendment in other motor vehicle legislation, so that
only TRAC leasing lawyers know that it is there. For example, in Mis-
souri, the statute resides between the provision granting purple heart re-
cipients special license plates and the one defining "boat dealer.",34 On
the CUE scale, this one ranks in negative numbers.
I am painfully sensitive to this particular issue because I have spent
several years of my life studying section 1-201(37), and I happen to think
that, with all its flaws, it scores high on the CUE scale. I admit that I
have a bias in favor of my interpretation of the statute-that on this is-
sue, I qualify as a whore. I am offended because this amendment directly
contradicts the intent of section 1-201(37). But I am also offended by
this provision, foisted on the Missouri Legislature, because it so despica-
bly hides the ball. Would a reasonable lawyer assume that such a provi-
sion might naturally be an amendment to section 1-201(37)? I believe so,
and in some states it is.35 But in most states it is wel-hidden. 36 In Mis-
33. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 301.452 (Vernon Supp. 1992). It provides:
In the case of motor vehicles or trailers as those terms are defined in section 301.010,
RSMo, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a transaction does not create
a sale or security interest merely because it provides that the rental price is permitted
or required to be adjusted under the agreement either upward or downward by refer-
ence to the amount realized upon sale or other disposition of the motor vehicle or
trailer.
'd.
34. See id. §§ 301.451-.455 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
35. The amendment is located in § 1-201(37) in North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 41-01-11(37) (Supp. 1991).
36. The TRAC leasing lobby has obtained enactment of this language in some form in at
least 16 states. The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 32-8-60.1 (Supp. 1992); Arizona,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-287(b) (Supp. 1992); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.271 (West
Supp. 1993); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 section, para. 3-201.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992);
Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.2A110 (Callaghan Supp. 1993); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 168A.17(la) (West Supp. 1993); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 301.452; New Jersey,
1992 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 128 (West); New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 397-B (McKin-
ney Supp. 1993); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-11(37); Ohio, 1992 Ohio Laws 235
(amending OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.13(c)); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1110(F)
(Supp. 1993); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-3.1-27 (Supp. 1992); Texas, TEx. REV.
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souri, one must scour the motor vehicle code to find it. It was not listed
in the Missouri Legislative Service as a commercial law provision, and
the people who might have opposed it (like me) missed it entirely.
Ultimately, this provision will be adopted in all fifty states, and then,
I suppose, it will meet the requirement of uniformity. But elegance?
Never! It's like those abysmal tax code provisions that only benefit one
family,37 or the ridiculous new provision in the Bankruptcy Code
designed specifically to wrest the airport gates out of the TWA
bankruptcy.
38
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has made a decision not to oppose this amendment,39 although it also has
made clear that this acquiescence is not intended as an expression of ap-
proval for the treatment of all TRAC leases as true leases.4 I think that
this is a mistake, but I understand that they are an organization with
limited resources, and a well-financed group like the TRAC lease lobby
could stop the adoption of Article 2A dead in the water.41
And that's the rub. Lobbyists may come to the drafting committee
meetings, and if they lose there, take it to the floor of the ALI or
NCCUSL. And if they lose there, they can go to the individual state
legislatures. Indeed, some lobbyists no longer bother with drafting com-
mittee meetings because they know that they can stop the process in the
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1(c) (West Supp. 1993); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-640.1
(Michie Supp. 1992); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 342.03 (Supp. 1992).
37. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6166 (1988); see also Andrew Pollack, Another Coup for the Fighting
Gallos, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1986, § 3, at 1 (referring to cited change in federal estate tax law as
"Gallo Amendments").
38. Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act, Pub. L. No. 102-365, § 19, 106 Stat. 972,
982-85 (1992) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365). For a discussion of the intent of the statute,
see Patricia Miller, City Seeks to Buy TWA Gate Leases, ST. Louis Bus. J., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1
(referring to legislation sponsored by Missouri Senator John Danforth intended to benefit St.
Louis).
39. See Letter from John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, to Edwin H. [sic] Huddleson, III (Aug. 16, 1990) (on file
with author).
40. Id. It is the position of the staff that the quoted language does not shortcut the analy-
sis required of a court in its interpretation of § 1-201(37). In other words, the adoption of the
provision does not convert all TRAC leases into true leases under the Code. Instead, a court
confronted with a TRAC lease provision should go through the same analysis of the lease that
it would go through for a lease that contains one of the provisions specifically approved by the
amendment. Telephone Interview with John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Sept. 23, 1992). Of course, the inclusion of
a single approved provision does not make the transaction a true lease.
41. In fact, the TRAC leasing industry has been of assistance in obtaining passage of Arti-
cle 2A because the compromise was reached on its special interest language. But the threat
was very real that they would stop 2A if the drafters insisted on classifying TRAC leases as
security interests.
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legislatures. And if they lose this year, they can come back next year. Or
the next.
And meanwhile the madonnas have gone on to other projects, or
they are changing the oil in the Volkswagen Beetle that has 200,000 miles
on it, or they cannot make another trip to the state capitol to fight. And
when the fight goes out of the madonnas, the UCC will be nothing but a
patchwork quilt of special interest legislation, and we will wistfully re-
member when the Code was the Code that Karl gave us, a singular thing
of beauty.
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